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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, claims brought by transgender students re-
questing accommodations from a public school have been framed
under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational pro-
gram or activity that receives federal funding.' Although the stat-
utory language does not specifically include discrimination on the
basis of gender identity, a number of advocates argued that gender
identity was encompassed by the term sex, and a number of federal
courts agreed. More notably, in May 2016, the Department of Ed-
ucation ("DOE") issued a "Dear Colleague" letter interpreting the
statutory language to include discrimination on the basis of gender
identity, specifically noting that Title IX thus prohibits discrimi-
nation against transgender students.2 Given the seemingly chang-
ing tide in agency interpretation, as well as an increasing number
of courts agreeing, the statutory argument dominated new claims.
With the change in presidential administrations, however, came
a sharp about-face in agency reading of the statute. In February
2017, the DOE withdrew the prior letter, and subsequently an-
nounced that the Department would no longer represent
transgender students and their claims. 3 At around the same time,
* Professor, Penn State Law; J.D., Yale Law School; M.Phil., University of Cam-
bridge; B.A., University of Southern California. Thanks to Athena Dufour, Chris Marple,
and Kellen Shearin for extremely helpful organizing and editing.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
2. Catherine E. Lhamon & Vanita Gupta, U.S. DEP'T JUST. & U.S. DEP'T EDUC., Dear
Colleague Letter on Transgender Students 1 (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offi
ces/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ADT-FTZ2].
3. See U.S. DEP'T JUST. & U.S. DEP'T EDUC., Dear Colleague Letter 1 (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/942021/download [https://perma.cc/5XRQ-PAZ9]; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't Educ., U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos Issues Statement on
New Title IX Guidance (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-secre
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then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memo stating that
the similar statutory language forbidding employment discrimina-
tion because of sex in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not apply to discrimination against transgender employees. 4 The
Trump administration agencies presented a united front that the
term "sex" meant solely biological sex, and not gender identity.
Given the changing interpretation of Title IX, both statutory and
constitutional arguments supporting the right of public school stu-
dents to express their gender in any manner contrary to traditional
gendered norms have renewed vitality. In the decades since Stone-
wall, students facing school discipline for nonconforming gender
presentation that violated school dress codes have attempted to
challenge the dress codes as violating their First Amendment free
expression rights. Tracing these arguments is not only helpful as a
historical exercise, but also to present alternative arguments un-
der an unsympathetic presidential administration and Supreme
Court. In today's world in which the Trump administration targets
transgender students, employees, and service members, one strat-
egy is to embrace gender nonconformity for cisgender, transgender,
and nonbinary students all at once, in the hopes that thinking
about the expression rights of students will be a more fruitful ap-
proach than just relying on Title IX.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The main federal law protecting students from discrimination
and harassment in their schools is Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972, which prohibits discrimination "on the
basis of sex" in any educational program or activity that receives
federal funding.5 The term "sex" can be read in very different ways:
narrowly to apply only to categorical discrimination against a bio-




4. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. on Revised Treatment of Transgender Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Oct. 4,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1006981/download [https://perma.cc/V658-QE
M2].
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
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The DOE's reading of the word "sex," specifically whether it in-
cludes gender identity, has rapidly swung back and forth in recent
years. In 2016, the DOE took an affirmative position that Title IX
specifically protects transgender students from discrimination in
the form of a "Dear Colleague" letter explaining the Department's
reading that the term "sex" covered gender identity.6 In February
2017, however, the switch in political leadership from President
Obama and Secretary of Education John King to President Trump
and Secretary Betsy DeVos also meant a switch in policy. The DOE
withdrew the prior guidance letter, and later announced that the
Department would not represent transgender students with claims
of discrimination against their public schools.7 This shift has been
consistent across other departments and statutes, most notably the
Department of Justice and its reading of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.8 Although Title IX and Title VII are portions of
different statutes and have slightly different language, the root
question of how to define "sex" is very similar, and courts called
upon to interpret Title IX have often cited readings of Title VII as
persuasive authority.9 It is thus unsurprising and significant that
the Department of Justice has similarly changed its position under
President Trump to argue that Title VII does not protect employees
from discrimination on the basis of gender identity. 10
Changes in the DOE's reading of Title IX are not determinative
of course, and the current administration's position may also be
reversed by subsequent leadership. The statutory language has al-
ready been read by some courts to protect transgender students
from discrimination, and such interpretation has continued past
the February 2017 withdrawal of guidance. For example, a student
named Gavin Grimm had famously been asking his high school to
recognize his male gender identity since 2014, including a lawsuit
that had been granted a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
and even had oral argument scheduled." A main question in the
6. Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 2, at 1.
7. See Battle & Wheeler, supra note 3, at 1; Press Release, U.S. Dep't Educ., supra
note 3.
8. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen., supra note 4, at 2.
9. See, e.g., Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d. 1151, 1158, 1160-61 (C.D.
Cal. 2015).
10. Brief for Respondent at 12, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n, No. 18-1070, 2019 WL 3958416 (Aug. 16, 2019).
11. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716-17 (4th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016).
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case, however, turned on issuance of the 2016 "Dear Colleague" let-
ter, so in the wake of the withdrawal of the letter the oral argument
was canceled and the case remanded back down for re-evaluation. 12
Nonetheless, Grimm won a second victory in August 2019 when
the district court held that his high school had violated his rights
under Title IX, even without the explicit 2016 guidance regarding
gender identity. 13 As Grimm's case indicates, federal courts' read-
ings of the text of Title IX are not conclusively determined by the
DOE, so litigation about the meaning of Title IX will undoubtedly
continue.
The shifting ground underlying the statutory argument, how-
ever, indicates that Title IX may not be as strong of a legal argu-
ment as before. It certainly does not help transgender student
plaintiffs to have the DOE taking the opposite side of an argument
interpreting Title IX, and if the Supreme Court holds that Title VII
does not apply to transgender employees, that will be a strong per-
suasive argument that Title IX similarly does not apply to
transgender students.
To the extent that statutory arguments are weakened, it is the
contention of this Essay that a reinvigorated First Amendment
constitutional argument will provide an additional and distinct
line of reasoning as to why transgender students should be allowed
to wear clothing consistent with their gender identity. The next
Part turns to a history of such arguments demonstrating the prom-
ise of the First Amendment as a supplement to an imperiled Title
IX argument.
II. CLOTHING, GENDER IDENTITY, AND SPEECH
Clothing and other aesthetic choices such as hairstyle, makeup,
jewelry, and other accessories are arguably superficial aspects of
appearance, but are central to how people present their gender
identity to the world. 14 Deborah Ahrens and Andrew Siegel de-
scribe aesthetic choices as "central, not superficial or trivial, as-
pects of autonomy because of their critical role in facilitating the
12. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
13. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15CV54, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138246,
at *6-7, *27-28 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2019).
14. See Deanna J. Glickman, Fashioning Children: Gender Restrictive Dress Codes As
an Entry Point for the Trans* School to Prison Pipeline, 24 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 263, 265 (2015).
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communication of complicated and sometimes inchoate ideas, emo-
tions, and affinities." 15 This communication is particularly im-
portant for transgender children seeking to express their gender
identity.16 Choices around appearance are one of the first choices
that children have any control over, and dressing in clothes reflect-
ing their gender identity is often the first, and may be the only,
decision over which a transgender child can assert their control.17
The sartorial choices of students, however, are routinely limited
by dress codes. Ahrens and Siegel describe the adoption of dress
codes as progressing from rarities in the 1970s to "wildly popular"
today, uniting both sides of the political spectrum in favor of con-
sistent student clothing.18 There is not a rich history of
transgender students challenging dress codes, but there are a sig-
nificant number of challenges brought by cisgender students who
wanted to have something in their appearance that is at least ar-
guably gender nonconforming. An examination of such earlier
cases, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, demonstrates the poten-
tial in First Amendment challenges to restrictions on student ap-
pearance.
As the adoption of dress codes grew, so too did legal challenges
to them.19 In response, schools offered a number of reasons for
dress codes: promoting student safety by prohibiting clothing that
signals gang affiliation, for example. 20 Adoption of student uni-
forms has also been justified as promoting safety because it lets
school staff immediately identify intruders who are not wearing
the appropriate uniform and eliminates the risk of theft if a stu-
dent wears expensive items to school. 21
Dress codes have also been explained as a way to reduce distrac-
tion so that students are able to concentrate fully on their educa-
tional endeavors. 22 This often has a sharply gendered aspect, in
15. Deborah M. Ahrens & Andrew M. Siegel, Of Dress and Redress: Student Dress Re-
strictions in Constitutional Law and Culture, 54 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 96 (2019).
16. See Christine L. Olson, Transgender Foster Youth: A Forced Identity, 19 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 25, 29-30 (2009).
17. See Zenobia V. Harris, Breaking the Dress Code: Protecting Transgender Students,
Their Identities, and Their Rights, 13 SCHOLAR 149, 155-56 (2010).
18. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 15, at 52.
19. See id. at 56.
20. Glickman, supra note 14, at 269-70.
21. See Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54
BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 670-71 (2002).
22. Glickman, supra note 14, at 270-7 1.
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that the distraction school officials have in mind is a heteronorma-
tive worry that sexually attractive female students will distract
their male classmates. 23 An Arkansas superintendent, for example,
described a concern that male students would wear "bizarre" cloth-
ing, whereas female students might wear something "revealing or
seductive." 24 Of course, what was considered revealing and seduc-
tive in the early 1970s strikes modern ears as unremarkable, such
as one school's assertion that "the wearing of culottes, slacks or
pantsuits by female students ... results in an increased amount of
physical contact and familiarity between boys and girls in school
surroundings."25
Another type of distraction, however, was students who broke
the expected mold, including gendered norms of appearance, in a
way that other students reacted to. A common example of this was
male students who wanted to grow their hair long-again high-
lighting changing social mores, "long" in the 1970s meant hair that
reached over their ears or long enough to touch their collar. School
descriptions of such students often claimed that the students spent
too much time styling and adjusting their hair, sometimes using
feminized language to do so. One teacher explained the distracting
influence of two students who were "constantly combing, flipping,
looking in mirrors and rearranging their hair."26 Another teacher
at the same school said that "hardly a day would go by that she
would not have to interrupt her teaching and say: 'Put your combs
away. This is not a beauty parlor. This is a school classroom."' 27
Another school explained the "disruptive influence" of boys with
long hair as "combing, styling and arranging their hair in classes;
being late for classes because they linger in the restrooms combing
their hair; congregating at mirrors provided for girls while combing
their hair; creating unsanitary conditions . .. through dandruff ac-
cumulating on desks from boys' handling their hair in the school
room." 2 8 Although most of the testimony and other evidence re-
garding such disturbances came from teachers, there were also
23. See Meredith J. Harbach, Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and Public School
Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1039-40 (2016); Wendy Mahling, Secondhand Codes:
An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MINN. L. REV.
715, 718 (1996).
24. Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 161 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
25. Johnson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 60, 508 P.2d 547, 548 (Idaho 1973)
26. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 217.
28. Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
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multiple examples of other students reacting to boys with long hair
with physical harassment, including "vigilantes," as one lawyer de-
scribed them, 2 9 who attacked classmates with scissors and cut off
the offending long hair themselves. 30 Following a strict dress code,
in the school's eyes, prevents such disruption and even violence
within the school.
One challenge to such dress codes attempted by many student
plaintiffs was to argue that the dress code violated their First
Amendment speech and expression rights. In 1969, the Supreme
Court vindicated the speech rights of students, even inside of a
school, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, fa-
mously holding that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 31 Absent material and sub-
stantial interference with the educational activities of the school,
the Court established, school officials could not constitutionally
prohibit or punish student expression. 32 The expression in Tinker
was very clear: the student plaintiffs wore black armbands that
everyone understood to be protesting the Vietnam War. 33 The
Court described this expression as "direct, primary First Amend-
ment rights akin to 'pure speech."' 34
Not all clothing and aesthetic choices convey such a clear mes-
sage, however. At one extreme are cases involving clothing or ac-
cessories that are literally emblazoned with text. Those messages
are impossible to understand as anything but speech, such as but-
tons that said "I'm not listening scab" worn by students during a
teacher's strike, 35 or a t-shirt protesting the school dress code that
read "Coed Naked Civil Liberties: Do It To The Amendments."36
Other unusual uses of clothing and jewelry were similarly easily
understood as speech by courts, such as wearing a military uniform
29. Myers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
30. See Gfellv. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1971); Ferrellv. Dall. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
32. Id. at 509.
33. Id. at 504.
34. Id. at 508.
35. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1992).
36. Pyle By & Through Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 162 (D. Mass.
1994).
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during a theatrical performance with an explicit anti-war mes-
sage, 37 or wearing rosary beads as a necklace. 38
It was not universally clear, however, whether less explicit mes-
sages conveyed through clothing, hair, and other stylistic choices
were expression under the ambit of the First Amendment. The
Tinker Court did not answer the question, saying merely that
"[t]he problem posed by the present case does not relate to regula-
tion of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or
deportment." 39 The Court's mention of hairstyle was prescient, as
male students with long hair were the most common challenge to
school dress codes throughout the 1970s, 4 0 resulting in over 150
reported cases between 1968 and 1977.41 Such cases were common
enough that the Fifth Circuit began one per curiam opinion wea-
rily, "This is another haircut case."4 2
Hair length cases are particularly interesting for a modern
reader, because they sometimes contain shades of prejudice, as ob-
servers assumed that long hair on a male student signaled both
femininity and homosexuality. One student with long hair got into
a physical fight with another student who called him "pretty boy." 4 3
An Iowa judge explained the controversy around boys with long
hair by writing that "most hair rules are promulgated largely, if
not entirely, because there are people who are repelled by the sight
of a male with hair length and style which in times past has been
almost exclusively reserved for the fairer sex." 44 A school adminis-
trator argued that "if boys were allowed to wear long hair so as to
look like girls, it would create problems with the continuing oper-
ation of the school because of confusion over appropriate dressing
room and restroom facilities." 45 Another staffer described male stu-
dents with long hair jokingly being told to use the girl's restroom,
including one student who "refused to go to the boy's restroom until
37. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Schacht v. United States, 398
U.S. 58, 59-60 (1970)).
38. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08.
40. See Amy Mitchell Wilson, Public School Dress Codes: The Constitutional Debate,
1998 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 147, 156-60.
41. See Natalie Smith, Eliminating Gender Stereotypes in Public School Dress Codes:
The Necessity of Respecting Personal Preference, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 251, 253 (2012).
42. Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 433 F.2d 355, 355 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam).
43. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 173 (Alaska 1972).
44. Turley v. Adel Cmty. Sch. Dist., 322 F. Supp. 402, 410 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
45. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1971).
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the other boys had left" and others who "would eat in the lunch-
room only with the girls and never eat with the boys."46
Such students, however, did not frame their hairstyle as ex-
pressing anything feminine. To the contrary, many of the plaintiffs
in the early cases admitted they did not intend to convey any spe-
cific message. Statements explicitly disclaiming any cognizable
message abound.47 One student "flatly stated that his hair
style [sic] was not a badge or a symbol of any group." 4 8 Another stu-
dent explained that he wanted long hair because he "just like[s]
it." 4 9 Decisions quoting students explaining their hairstyles remind
the reader that the plaintiffs were, after all, children: "I think it
looks better for one reason, and for another reason, I don't associ-
ate with a group, but I try to disassociate with general society, you
know, people that look normal, because I am not entirely satisfied
with things that are happening like this."5 0
Another student said that his hair was not meant as an expres-
sion of any idea, but instead as "[a] symbol of my choice. More of a
symbol of my desire to appear the way I wish to. . . . My individual
rights."51 More than one case involved students in a band, prompt-
ing courts to find that the students "pursued their course of per-
sonal grooming for the purpose of enhancing the popularity of the
musical group in which they performed." 52 (Entertainingly, one
such band recorded a protest song about the principal who wanted
them to cut their hair, called "Keep Your Hands Off It."53)
In the absence of any cognizable message that the students
claimed to be conveying with their hair, it was very easy for courts
to dismiss the First Amendment as inapplicable. 54 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's explanation is typical, reasoning that although long hair
might in circumstances be considered symbolic speech, "the record
before us does not establish that the minor plaintiffs selected the
46. Ferrell v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1968).
47. See Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1074; Giangreco v. Ctr. Sch. Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776, 779
(W.D. Mo. 1969).
48. King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971).
49. Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 1971) (alteration in original).
50. Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1970).
51. Pendley v. Mingus Union High Sch. Dist., 504 P.2d 919, 921 (Ariz. 1972).
52. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
53. Ferrell v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1968).
54. See King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971).
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length of their hair for any reasons other than personal prefer-
ence."5 5 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit noted that although "[for some
... the wearing of long hair is intended to convey a discrete mes-
sage to the world," it was often taste or "peer group influence," cit-
ing a plaintiff who explicitly disclaimed any message and simply
said "I like my hair long."5 6 Courts had little trouble concluding
that mere "expressions of individuality rather than a contribution
to the storehouse of ideas" was not properly considered expression
protected by the First Amendment.57 Many courts thus found no
cognizable constitutional issue raised by application of dress codes
to hair length.58
Some courts, however, did see a constitutional problem with
dress codes that mandated short hair for male students. Such de-
cisions were not full-throated vindications of the expressive value
of hair, in large part because few plaintiffs could articulate any
message they wanted their hair to express. The Fourth Circuit's
description is typical:
Perhaps the length of one's hair may be symbolic speech which under
some circumstances is entitled to the protection of the First Amend-
ment. But the record before us does not establish that the minor plain-
tiffs selected the length of their hair for any reasons other than per-
sonal preference. For that reason, we prefer in this case to treat their
right to wear their hair as they wish as an aspect of the right to be
secure in one's person guaranteed by the due process clause . .. 59
55. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972).
56. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1972).
57. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971).
58. Zeller v. Donegal Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 608 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Com-
plaints which are based on nothing more than school regulations of the length of a male
student's hair do not 'directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values' and are not
cognizable in federal courts . . . ."); Karr, 460 F.2d at 613 ("Is there a constitutionally pro-
tected right to wear one's hair in a public high school in the length and style that suits the
wearer? We hold that no such right is to be found within the plain meaning of the Constitu-
tion."); King, 445 F.2d at 940 ("We do not believe that the plaintiffs have established the
existence of any substantial constitutional right which is in these two instances being in-
fringed."); Freeman, 448 F.2d at 262; Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218-19 (6th Cir.
1970) (per curiam).
59. Massie, 455 F.2d at 783.
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Other justifications as to why school dress codes were unconsti-
tutional included state constitutional liberty rights, 0 the Due Pro-
cess clause,6 1 the Equal Protection clause,6 2 and the Ninth Amend-
ment.6 3 Even in decisions rooted in other rights, several courts
acknowledged the significance of expression, such as the Alaska
Supreme Court, which noted that "[h]airstyles have been the sub-
ject of great variety and individual taste and have traditionally
been left to personal decision; they are the manifestations of our
diverse and numerous individual personalities."6 4 Although the
First Circuit rejected a First Amendment framing, it "recognize [d]
that there may be an element of expression and speech involved in
one's choice of hair length and style, if only the expression of dis-
dain for conventionality."65 Perhaps the most striking dicta was de-
livered by the Fourth Circuit, which mused that "[a]lthough there
exists no depiction of Jesus Christ, either reputedly or historically
accurate, He has always been shown with hair at least the length
of that of plaintiffs." 6
Two lessons may thus be drawn from the dress code hairstyle
cases. First, no court will read into sartorial choices a message that
the student in question can't articulate. Teenagers who make aes-
thetic choices to be an individual, because they like it, or because
they want to look cool onstage with their band will not be viewed
as expressing any cognizable message that should receive First
Amendment protection. Second, however, courts recognize the pos-
sibility of such expression, and explicitly note that if an aesthetic
choice delivered a recognizable message, that would change the
analysis by implicating the First Amendment.
60. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972) ("We hold that under article I,
section 1 of the Alaska constitution's affirmative grant to all persons of the natural right to
'liberty,' students attending public educational institutions in Alaska possess a constitu-
tional right to wear their hair in accordance with their personal tastes.").
61. Stull v. Sch. Bd. of W. Beaver Junior-Senior High Sch., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir.
1972), overruled by, Zeller, 517 F.2d 600; Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 942-44 (7th
Cir. 1972); Massie, 455 F.2d at 783; Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971);
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034,
1036 (7th Cir. 1969).
62. Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970).
63. Murphy v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 480 P.2d 878, 884 (Idaho 1971).
64. Breese, 501 P.2d at 169.
65. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1283.
66. Massie, 455 F.2d at 780.
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Although no other aesthetic choice generated the same amount
of litigation as male hair length, other dress code challenges gen-
erally fit the same pattern. Occasionally courts found that a school
had created too vague of a dress code,6 7 or overstepped its authority
with a blanket prohibition of female students wearing slacks,6 8 but
a key question in other cases is whether the student was delivering
a specific message. In New Hampshire, students challenging a ban
of dungarees gave "no suggestion that the wearing of blue jeans,
clean or otherwise, in any way constitutes a right of expression.
The First Amendment, therefore, does not apply and is not an is-
sue."69
Slightly more modern cases similarly refuse to find First Amend-
ment significance where a message is not easily identifiable. Sev-
eral examples in the 1990s involved male students who wanted to
wear earrings, but could not identify the message their earring ex-
pressed,70 or students simultaneously challenging both hair and
earring regulations without an explanation of what their long hair
and earrings conveyed.71 One such student's "only message is one
of his 'individuality."' 7 2 A court in Ohio rejected the challenge of
two siblings who were kicked out of their prom after both arrived
in gender nonconforming clothes; the brother in a dress, heels, and
fur cape, and the sister in a tuxedo and men's dress shoes. 73 The
case does not recount any specific message the two wished to con-
vey, nor whether they identified as gender nonconforming,
transgender, or any other motivation behind their dress. 74 After
they sued, the court found that the school acted appropriately to
further the "valid educational purposes of teaching community val-
ues and maintaining school discipline." 75 One judge gave a partic-
ularly blunt explanation when rejecting the argument that wear-
ing sagging pants far below the waistline was expression, grousing
67. Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D. Conn. 1970).
68. Scott v. Bd. of Edue., Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 17, 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1969).
69. Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D.N.H. 1970).
70. Hines v. Caston Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
71. Barber v. Colo. Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1995); see also Bd. ofTrs. of
Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 365, 373 (Tex. 1997) (declining to revisit
the issue).
72. Olesen ex rel. Olesen v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 822
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (citation omitted).
73. Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1355.
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that "not every defiant act by a high school student is constitution-
ally protected speech." 76
Another negative treatment involved a female student named
Nikki Youngblood, who wanted to wear a shirt and tie for her sen-
ior photograph (like male students) instead of the velvet drape of
cloth that female students were expected to wear.77 Although she
claimed to be expressing a message that "women do not have to
conform to gender stereotypes," the court rejected this and found
there was "no constitutionally protected right for a female to wear
a shirt and tie for senior portraits."7 8
There are at least two recent examples, however, of courts rec-
ognizing the expressive value of gender nonconforming students.
One involved a student named Constance McMillen who wanted to
bring another girl as her date to high school prom and to wear a
tuxedo instead of a dress.79 Her school refused to allow her to do
either, and she sued.80 Analyzing her claim, the court described
Constance as intending to communicate the message of "her social
and political views that women should not be constrained to wear
clothing that has traditionally been deemed 'female' attire."81 The
court stated explicitly that it "f[ound] this expression and commu-
nication of her viewpoint is the type of speech that falls squarely
within the purview of the First Amendment." 82
An even stronger example took place in Massachusetts in 2000.
A student known as Pat Doe in litigation was assigned male at
76. Green ex rel. Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D.N.M. 1995);
see also William C. Vandivort, I See London, I See France: The Constitutional Challenge to
"Saggy" Pants Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 667, 680-82 (2009).
77. See Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children's Right To Be Queer, 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 425, 492 (2013) (citing Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Gender Um-
brella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 10 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006)).
78. Id.
79. McMillen v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 701 (N.D. Miss. 2010).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 704.
82. Id. at 705. The court ultimately declined to issue an injunction because after the
school canceled the prom, parents planned a "private" prom that every student including
Constance was invited to. Id. at 706. Unfortunately, it appears that the parent-sponsored
prom was a Potemkin village, as Constance and a handful of other students attended one
prom while all of the rest of her classmates attended a secret and separate prom. See Con-
stance McMillen, Fake Prom? Itawamba Dance Was Kept Secret from Lesbian Teen,
HUFFPOST (June 5, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/constance-memillen-
fake-p-n_525856 [https://perma.cc/HNN9-PANJ].
2020] 939
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
birth, but partway through seventh grade began to express her fe-
male gender identity through clothing and makeup. 83 After a series
of disciplinary incidents with the school principal, she was told
that she could not attend school while wearing female clothing. 84
In response she sued, alleging a number of legal and constitutional
violations, including that the school was violating her First
Amendment free expression rights.85 A Massachusetts court
granted a preliminary injunction ordering the school to allow her
to wear clothing consistent with her gender identity, finding that
she was "likely to establish that, by dressing in clothing and acces-
sories traditionally associated with the female gender, she is ex-
pressing her identification with that gender." 86 Moreover, the court
specified that her fellow students, teachers, and other school staff
would understand that message, making it symbolic speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment.87
This opens the door to a promising legal argument framing the
clothing and other aesthetic choices of transgender students today
as protected First Amendment expression. The claims of gender
nonconforming students today fall under Tinker so long as the stu-
dent is dressing to express their gender identity and articulates
their message as such. This seems easily done by transgender stu-
dents, who are increasingly identifying as transgender at younger
ages than in the past.88 Where teenage boys in the 1970s could not
express any message they wanted to communicate through their
hair, it seems very simple for a transgender student to say "I want
to wear these clothes to communicate that I am a girl."
Merely expressing speech is not the end of Tinker analysis, of
course: speech might nonetheless create a material interference
with educational activities if students respond with outrage, such
as the other boys in the 1970s who were so horrified by long hair
that they took scissors and cut their classmate's hair themselves.
83. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491, at *1-3
(Oct. 11, 2000), aff'd sub nom., Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638 2000 Mass.
App. LEXIS 1128 (Nov. 30, 2000).
84. Id. at *2-4.
85. Id. at *5-6.
86. Id. at *10.
87. Id. at *9-11.
88. See Dara E. Purvis, Transgender Children, Teaching Early Acceptance, and the




Acceptance of gender nonconformity and transgender children var-
ies considerably, but at least in areas where the tolerance of the
student body outpaces the tolerance of the local school board, it
may actually be to a student's advantage to ask whether their
classmates reacted to their gender expression as part of the inquiry
into their First Amendment rights.89
CONCLUSION
Although framing clothing choices as expression is a viable ad-
ditional argument to set alongside other claims such as under Title
IX, it has significant limitations. Clifford Rosky contrasts the var-
ying success of Nikki Youngblood and Pat Doe by describing the
courts' analyses as "quintessentialism," recognizing Doe's gender
only because "her gender identity was fixed early in life and could
not be changed."90 Rosky argues that "courts have been more will-
ing to protect gender as an identity or status-as an unchosen or
immutable trait-rather than as the expression of a particular
viewpoint."91
Even more significantly, casting expressions of gender as free
speech very literally does not get students everywhere they need
to go. The free speech frame may ensure that students can dress
the way they want, but it would not, for example, give them access
to bathrooms and locker rooms consistent with their gender iden-
tity. Additionally, application of Tinker allows schools to prohibit
and punish speech if classmates react in a way that disrupts edu-
cational activities, so the speech of students in more conservative
areas is effectively less protected. 92
That said, a reinvigorated free speech argument has both stra-
tegic and conceptual advantages that make it worthy of considera-
89. Although the issue was framed under Title IX rather than the First Amendment, a
case involving bathroom access for a transgender boy demonstrated this point when his
school argued that allowing him to use the boy's bathroom would violate the privacy rights
of other male students. The Seventh Circuit easily found the school's concern to be without
support, given that the student had used the boys' bathrooms for six months without a single
student complaint. See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd.
of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1052 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom., Kenosha Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ. v. Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018).
90. See Rosky, supra note 77, at 493.
91. Id.
92. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-09 (1969).
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tion. If the Supreme Court reads Title VII to not prohibit discrimi-
nation in employment against transgender employees, 93 it is very
likely that readings of Title IX will soon go the same way. There
are multiple paths forward if that happens, including legislative
action to either amend Title IX or separately and explicitly protect
transgender students in public schools, but any legislative re-
sponse would take time, and the First Amendment argument can
be made today.
Second, notwithstanding Rosky's criticism of the Youngblood
and Doe courts, the framing of speech further opens up the field to
less clearly defined gender variance, such as nonbinary, gender-
queer, or agender students, or students who identify as cisgender
but prefer wearing clothing coded as the other gender. Courts
would likely find it difficult to fit a student explaining clothing
choices as "I felt more masculine today, and more feminine yester-
day" into the framing of Title IX, but might more easily grasp "to-
day I wanted to express that I felt masculine, and yesterday I
wanted to express that I felt very feminine" as speech. In a coun-
terintuitive way, therefore, the relatively conservative analysis of
the 1970s points towards a more progressive path today, supple-
menting statutory arguments under Title IX with constitutional
protections for expression of all genders.
93. See supra Part I.
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